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It is a widely shared opinion among specialists that language is an evolutionary innovation,
or that it contains some key evolutionary innovations. However, such claims are not
based on a correspondingly consensual concept of “evolutionary innovation,” but are
rather expressed on atheoretical grounds. This fact has thus far acted as an obstacle for
the collaborative effort upon which the task of disentangling the evolution of this human
capacity should be built. In this paper, we suggest a formal approach to the issue, based
on Wagner’s recent theory of homologies and novelties. Within this new framework, we
conclude that language is the human instantiation (thus an “homolog”) of a character
widely represented in the nervous system of animals, which incorporates a number
of interdependent innovative states that allows us conceptualizing it as a “variational
modality” of this ancient organ.
Keywords: language, brain, computation, homology, novelty
Maybe taking this message at heart can alleviate the frustration of those among us that feel that too much
arbitrariness is involved in the current evolutionary-psychological debates.
Callebaut (2005, p. 21)
Introduction
Language evolution is a lively research topic, regarding which many diverging views coexist that
mostly differ in the role they ascribe to natural selection in the evolutionary shaping of the faculty
of language (FL). Contrasting to this point of disagreement, a more consensual idea within the field
is that the FL is a novelty with no clear correlates in non-human organisms. We however believe
that such a stance is almost meaningless, for it has never been seriously grounded on a theory of
evolutionary innovations. This paper is aimed at shedding some light on this issue, mostly taking
advantage of Wagner’s recent theory of homologies and evolutionary innovations (Wagner, 2014).
Building upon prior reconstructions of the FL as a system of natural computation plus an
associated array of interfaces with other cognitive systems (Hauser et al., 2002; Balari and Lorenzo,
2013), we argue that language only qualifies as an evolutionary novelty in Wagner’s weakest sense:
i.e., as a Type II novelty, which means that it does not purport the introduction of a new organ—or
Type I novelty. The FL, according to the view put forward here, derives from the evolution
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of new “states” of computational power and connectivity of
a character—the Central Computational Complex (CCC)—
whose “identity” largely predates its human instantiation. In
any event, language comprises such a characteristic display of
states that it may also qualify as a “variational modality” within
Wagner’s framework: i.e., a developmentally rather removed set
of character states relatively to its homologs—comparable, for
example, to the case of the tetrapod limb relatively to the teleost
fin.
After reviewing some recent proposals as to what kind
of innovation language is supposed to be, the paper next
explores and justifies the identity of the ancient character of
which language is hypothetically deemed a particular homolog.
According to Wagner’s theory, this task entails deciphering
a particular “character identity network,” understood as a
system of interactive gene-related resources that interfaces
between inductive signals providing positional information, on
the one hand, and downstream realizer genes in charge of
shaping the different homologs of the character, on the other
hand. While it may seem premature to speculate on such a
level of analysis regarding the CCC, we nevertheless try to
gather and interpret some relevant information supporting our
identity claim. We then present some candidate homologs of
language within this hypothetical framework and advance some
suggestions aimed at substantiating the idea of grouping them
into different variational modalities in Wagner’s sense. We hope
the conclusions of this paper to be illustrative of the important
role that language may play in helping to fine-tune a general
theory of evo–devo.
The Problem of the Continuity Problem
The idea that there is an evolutionary gap between language
and every other aspect of non-human cognition and behavior
is almost consensual within the field of expertise currently
known as biolinguistics (Boeckx and Grohmann, 2013). The
stance entails that language is customarily seen as a distinctly
human capacity that raises a “continuity problem” (Chomsky,
1968; Bickerton, 1990) and thus defies a normal evolutionary
conceptualization as a modified descendant from other more or
less similar cognitive/behavioral traits. In any event, alternative
positions exist that are not entirely uniform in this respect, for
some representative figures contend that language is “new” from
root to branch (Pinker and Jackendoff, 2005), while some others
are prepared to admit that there coexist in language shared
and non-shared components (Hauser et al., 2002). So a better
way of synthesizing the current consensus around this issue is
that language incorporates at least some key radical innovations,
which most researchers agree to locate in its compositional
components—prominently in syntax, which endows the faculty
with its open-ended expressive power.
The main concern of this paper has to do with this particular
aspect of evolutionary linguistics, for contrarily to, for example,
the question of the role of selection in language evolution
(Bickerton, 2013), most scholars concur in regarding language—
or parts thereof—as new irrespective of any theoretical account
of what is and what is not “new” biologically speaking—thus on
purely intuitive grounds. A dramatic illustration of this point is
provided by the debate in 2005 among Pinker and Jackendoff,
on the one side, and Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch (HCF),
on the other, most of which revolved around the boundaries
between what is old and what is new in language, an assumedly
significant point for both parts in order to recruit the best
suited evolutionary explanation(s) to their case (Fitch et al., 2005;
Jackendoff and Pinker, 2005; Pinker and Jackendoff, 2005). To
say the least, the discussion was as acrimonious as unproductive,
for contenders were clearly using completely different and non-
standard concepts of novelty. Let us elaborate on this a bit more,
seeing how the question developed once the dust settled after this
squabble.
In what follows we will focus on some spin-offs of the HCF
(2002) paper, for alternative proposals developed within a more
traditional adaptationist-geneticist logic typical of evolutionary
psychology or behavioral ecology (along the lines of Pinker
and Bloom, 1990 or Pinker, 2003) appear to have languished
(Bolhuis and Wynne, 2009; Bolhuis et al., 2011). As for the
alternative view, its current position could be characterized
by its emphasis on two main, interconnected themes: (i) a
streamlined characterization of the “language phenotype,” and
(ii) a radicalization of its uniqueness claims with respect to its
allegedly core component (see below), with the net effect of
neutralizing any attempt to look for its precursors in other animal
species. We will deal with both issues in turn.
Point (i) is important because it represents, at least, a
minimal consensus view as to the organic nature of language
in contradistinction to other perspectives, where language is
attributed the ontological status of an external entity that
somehow interacts with the appropriate biological structures.
According to the alternative perspective developed in this paper,
the language phenotype is a particular functional system internal
to the human brain, the specific localization of which is however
not consensually agreed upon by specialists. Here we will roughly
characterize it as a pallio-stratal-pallial system that interfaces
in characteristic ways with other peripheral brain systems,
ultimately bringing about different forms of linguistic behavior.
In any event, the phenotype of concern must be detached from
this outer level of observable behavior, for the latter also relies on
historical grammatical traditions, stereotyped patterns of speech
acts, etc., which are not particularly relevant for the task of
disentangling the biological identity of the former. The generic
architectural properties of the language system according to
that view are illustrated in Figure 1 (Berwick et al., 2012, 2013;
Bolhuis et al., 2014).
It goes without saying that this is not a neuroanatomical
characterization of the linguistic phenotype, but just an
identification of its main functional components, which is
nonetheless a step forward to overcome one of the main
complicating factors in disentangling language evolution, namely
that “there is [. . . ] no consensus regarding the essential nature
of the language phenotype” (Bolhuis et al., 2014, p. 1). We share
with these authors that in order to circumscribe the “character
identity” of language—an obvious prerequisite to progress in
explaining its evolution, the task must be undertaken of reducing
it to its bare essentials (Balari and Lorenzo, 2013). Such an
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FIGURE 1 | The language phenotype: a minimalist reduction of language to its bare architectural essentials.
enterprise purports, according to this perspective, capturing the
basic architectural organization that defines language irrespective
of its particular socio-cultural instantiations—English, Chinese,
Italian, and so on, and also capturing what kind of activity
can be assigned to it, now abstracting away from the
categories and activity of other language-associated, but not
specifically linguistic cognitive systems—motor planning and
execution, perceptual categorization, conceptual representation
and intention fixing, etc. As we pointed out, a certain consensus
exists about the idea that adopting this minimalist position
(Chomsky, 1995) boils down to assuming a rather simple
architecture that comprises the three basic components displayed
in Figure 1:
(i) A finite inventory of primitive sound/meaning pairings—
Lexicon (L);
(ii) A combinatorial engine capable of composing an open-
ended number of expressions by continuously redeploying
lexical units and previous outputs of the engine itself—
Computational System (CS); and
(iii) Two interfaces with the sensory-motor and conceptual-
intentional systems of the mind/brain, where expressions
are respectively interpreted as instructions to the
peripheral anatomy associated to different channels of
externalization—oral, gestural, and so on, and as vehicles
for thought.
Within this restrictive framework, special attention is due to
the first (L) and second (CS) components (the blue square
in Figure 1), for they are the more persistently pinpointed
as supporting claims of uniqueness. For example, Bolhuis
et al.(2014, p. 1) promptly claim that language “has no equivalent
in any non-human species,” and, a few paragraphs below, add
that “before the appearance of merge, there was no faculty of
language as such, because this requires merge along with the
conceptual atoms of the lexicon” (Bolhuis et al., 2014, p. 2), where
“merge” is the term customarily reserved within this tradition
to refer to the basic operation in charge of building complex
linguistic objects. Thus, in sharp contrast to HCF’s original
mild speculations suggesting the possibility that all three main
components of the linguistic phenotype might have precursors in
some both extinct and extant non-human species (Hauser et al.,
2002, p. 1578), the uniqueness claim appears to have become an
untouchable a priori of sorts, to which views on language must of
necessity accommodate (Boeckx, 2013a, p. 8, for a brief history of
how the words “unique” and “specific” eventually crept into the
minimalist official discourse).
Summing up so far, HCF (2002) has eventually yielded to a
mosaic view of language (Boeckx, 2013b) in which a number
of different components interact to give rise to the full richness
and complexity observed in today’s human languages. This view,
moreover, while not denying that, at least functionally, language
works as a unit, contends that only some of its parts may be
shared with other species, while others (notably the CS and
plausibly also L) constitute true evolutionary novelties. The
emergence of the latter is what would explain the “cognitive gap”
between humans and the rest of non-human animals.
The following pages are aimed at shedding some light into
a number of complex questions posed by this conception of
language, starting with a non-trivial aspect of it: Namely, does
language actually qualify as the type of entity to which such
considerations legitimately apply? In other words, is it really
a (form/function) unit at the morphological level of analysis—
i.e., an organ? Only after this question is satisfactorily answered
may one proceed to the crucial question whether it is—or in
which specific sense it is—an old or a new organic component
of the human brain. What is clear from the start is that none of
these questions can be confronted in a theoretical vacuum, as
they belong to a delicate matter that must be faced respecting
all the standards of current biological thought, so let’s turn to
evolutionary novelties.
What is New about Evolutionary Novelties?
In a sense, every component part of an organism is a novelty,
for from the perspective of the present and looking back to its
evolutionary past there must be some prior point at which no
such component existed. From this general standpoint, it may
seem trivial to ask whether this or that organ is biologically
innovative. They all unexceptionally are (Wagner, 2011, p. 1).
The issue becomes however far from trivial when a more
particularized perspective is adopted, so instead of the previous
question one may rather ask at which specific point in evolution
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an organ of concern represented a biological novelty. Note
that the issue is thus inextricably linked to the also non-trivial
one of establishing homological classes (Müller and Wagner,
2003, p. 221), i.e., collections of organic structures that one
may confidently conclude instantiate the same organ in different
plants or animals—or in different locations of the same plant
or animal, as it seems reasonable to hold the position that
evolutionarily speaking such an organ was innovative just once
(Wagner, 2014, p. 417, for the conceptualization of apparent
counterexamples). So for the best or the worst, the fate of
unveiling biological novelties goes clearly hand in hand with
the ability of discerning homological relations among series of
organic structures. As a matter of fact the link is a definitional
one, as nicely captured in the following (definitional) statement
by Müller and Wagner:
Definition: A morphological novelty is a structure that is
neither homologous to any structure in the ancestral species nor
homonomous to any other structure of the same organism. (Müller
and Wagner, 1991, p. 243; emphasis in the original)
The good news about all these concerns is that “homology”
is a concept relatively easy to grasp intuitively and has served
as the grounds of the comparative approach to nature since
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries—despite the
intermittency due to its neglect by the Darwinian Synthesis
(Amundson, 2005, p. 103; Wagner, 2014, pp. 25–26); the
bad news is that discerning homologs becomes a much more
controversial issue when one tries to operationalize the concept
on mechanistic grounds and to apply it to particular instances.
Let us briefly review both sides of the matter.
Conceptually speaking, the most agreed upon definition of the
homology concept is due to Richard Owen and dates back to
1843: “The same organ in different animals under every variety
of form and function” (Owen, 1843, p. 379). So defined, the
concept thus refers to a kind of natural identity that is not
disturbed by the specializations that the corresponding structures
may show in agreement with their common uses or by other
formal peculiarities. Take as a suitable example the identity that is
supposed to exist between the appendages of the second thoracic
segment of flies, beetles, or butterflies, despite the fact that it
adopts the form of a wing in the first and third orders and the
form of a protective elytron in the second one, and also despite
the noticeable differences between insect wings along different
axes—shape, color, etc. Note that conversely, the definition above
also entails that similarities in terms of form and function do
not automatically qualify as evidence for homology. For example,
it is not the case that the wings of bats are homologous to
insect wings, despite their involvement in the corresponding
species’ flight and despite certain shared aerodynamic properties.
If anything, the wings of bats are putative homologs of insect
limbs—together with other vertebrate limbs (Shubin et al.,
2009), although this is an open question and one subject to
subtle discussions—see below for some comments. For the time
being, suffice it to conclude that correspondingly to these quite
consensual ideas on the homology concept, an associated concept
of “novelty” or “innovation” should also not rely on formal or
functional details, but should refer instead to the emergence of
character identities, underlying and embracing divergences-to-be
in both formal and functional terms. Such a conclusion obviously
deserves some elaboration.
The previous paragraph offers some grounds for choosing
among recent proposals concerning what is and what is not
new from a biological perspective. In particular, Wagner’s (2011)
suggestion, following a tradition that may be traced back to Mayr
(1960), is clearly a functional one, in that it mostly relies on the
benefits that changes may bestow upon their bearers as well as
on the opportunities for new extra-benefits that they may open
to these bearers’ descendants. Andreas Wagner’s definition of
“innovation” reads as follows:
A new feature that endows its bearer with qualitatively new,
often game-changing abilities. These may not only mean the
difference between life and death in a given environment (just
think of biosynthetic abilities), they may also create broad
platforms for future innovations, as did the innovations of
photosynthesis and of complex nervous systems (Wagner, 2011,
p. 1).
We are not suggesting that Andreas Wagner’s position is
right away wrong. As a matter of fact, what we actually think
is that his observations are aimed at a level of analysis different
from the level at which identity statements must be attached
in application of the homological method proper. For this
reason, it may be useful to keep the term “innovation” to that
former level—however unclear it is even in functional terms
(Wouters, 2003; Love, 2007), and to specialize the term “novelty”
instead—as inWagner (2014)—to name the kind of basic organic
identities that underlie prospective adaptive diversifications in
Andreas Wagner’s sense. From now on we will respect this
terminological distinction (Müller and Wagner, 2003, p. 219;
Erwin and Krakauer, 2004; Minelli and Fusco, 2005, p. 521;
Brigandt and Love, 2010).
From a formal point of view, while it is true that variation
along different axes (shape, color, tissue specialization, patterns of
correlations of parts, and so on) can be discerned in less intuitive
grounds than variants of function, it is also clear that it may be so
without altering the underlying identity of the variants so defined.
This is how Mayr introduced the issue some half-century ago:
Most evolutionary changes take place without the origin of
new structures. Even when we compare birds or mammals with
their strikingly different reptilian ancestors, we are astonished at
how few are the truly new structures. Most differences are merely
shifts in proportions, fusions, losses, secondary duplications,
and similar changes which do not materially affect what the
morphologist calls the “plan” of the particular type (Mayr, 1960,
p. 358).
The point has been newly raised and in our opinion
satisfactorily conceptualized by Wagner, on the grounds of a
well-motivated distinction between the concepts of “character
identity” and “character state” (Wagner, 2014, pp. 51–54). For
example, the fins of teleost fishes consist of four radials attached
to the shoulder girdle plus a complex of dermal bones/rays, while
the limbs of tetrapods consist of one bone attached to the body
and a set of two distal bones plus a number of endochondral long
bones/digits. Notwithstanding all these differences, a wide and
Frontiers in Ecology and Evolution | www.frontiersin.org 4 June 2015 | Volume 3 | Article 58
Balari and Lorenzo Conceptualizing language from a homological perspective
old consensus exists around the idea that fish fins and tetrapod
limbs are but variants of the same organ: Namely, the vertebrate
limb (Owen, 1849). So according to Wagner’s distinction, the
traits above are different states that the character of concern
adopts in different organic scenarios. In his own words, “states
are still variants of the same thing” (Wagner, 2014, p. 71), where
“thing” is a loose manner of referring to a character, the identity
of which underlies its manifold actual displays. Turning to our
particular concern with evolutionary novelties, a corollary of
Wagner’s ideas is that in parallel to the “identity/state” distinction
a two-level model of novelties can be entertained, for novelties
may reasonably purport the emergence of new identities—i.e.,
brand new organs, or the emergence of new states of pre-existent
identities—i.e., innovative variants (Wagner, 2014, pp. 126–127).
Wagner refers to the former as “Type I” novelties—e.g., the
vertebrate limb (Wagner, 2014, Chap. 10), and as “Type II”
novelties to the latter—e.g., the tridactyl limb, as opposed for
example to the prototypal pentadactyl variant (Wagner, 2014,
Chap. 11). A further related category introduced in Wagner
(2014) tries to accommodate the fact that certain Type II traits
characteristically appear in clusters, so none of them is as a
matter of fact accessible from an alternatively similar cluster—
e.g., the bundle of traits that respectively define and jointly
oppose fish fins and tetrapod limbs (Wagner, 2014, Chap. 10).
Wagner habilitates the “variational modality” concept to the
particular aim of referring to these complex arrangements of
Type II novelties (Wagner, 2014, p. 63).
Clearly enough, even if the categories and distinctions
introduced so far have a direct intuitive appeal, they do not suffice
by themselves to ground the most urgent kinds of questions that
a homological theory should be ready to answer. For example:
Why fish fins and tetrapod limbs are true homologs, instead of
similarly organized but different organs—say, analogs? Does this
particular homology relation extend to insect limbs? Etc. The
more ready a homological theory proves to be to answer these
and other similar questions on mechanistic grounds, the better
positioned it will be as an accurate account of natural identities.
The most promissory theories thus far point to development as
the right soil on which such an account must be built (Moczek,
2008). Let us briefly explain why and how.
Wagner contends that the conceptual distinction between
“character identity” and “character states”—and thus of “Type
I” and “Type II” novelties—has empirical correlates in the
mechanisms that govern the development of the different
morphologies that compose a body. In a nutshell, Wagner’s
claim boils down to the idea that components governing the
“identity” of a particular morphology, on the one hand, and the
“states” that such a morphology specifically displays, on the other
hand, can be disentangled at that mechanistic level, for which
he devotes the terms “character identity networks” (ChINs) and
“realizer genes,” respectively (Wagner, 2014, Chap. 3). According
to Wagner’s characterization, ChINs are reiterative patterns of
interaction between genetic sequences (and products thereof),
which interface between the positional information provided by
inductive signals, on the one side, and downstream realizers
in charge of character states differentiating among collections
of homologs, on the other side. Experiments in which certain
point mutations lead to the loss of a character identity (e.g., the
identity of the hind wing in the case of Ubx mutants of flies,
beetles, and butterflies) may be interpreted in a way congenial to
Wagner’s model, for what shows up instead of the wild condition
is an alternative character identity (e.g., the one of the respective
forewings) (Deutsch, 2005; Wagner, 2014, p. 127).
From the point of view of the novelty issue, Wagner’s
elaboration of the previous ideas purports that the origins of
new ChINs—i.e., core regulatory machineries, and the origins
of realizer genes—i.e., their subordinate genetic sequences and
products—must be correspondingly disentangled. Obviously
enough, when a particular ChIN originates, it must be already
in charge of one or another set of realizer genes, but this
is not particularly challenging for the theory. In this respect,
a particularly illuminating case is offered by the origins of
the tetrapod limb, the prototypal instantiation of which is a
pentadactyl limb (Wagner, 2014, Chap. 11). Actually, this variant
is the one to which limbs tend to recede in pathological or
experimental conditions; but the curious fact is that according
to the paleontological record it was not the first to exist, as
variants with more than five digits are the most frequent as
we move back to the putative origins of the character. These
kinds of situations seem to support the autonomy claim between
identities and states, as it clearly shows that the former remain
constant irrespective of historical changes, which may include
the fixation of resilient realizations acting as buffers against
natural or artificially induced stress conditions. What we actually
observe is thus that a character is ultimately a complexly
multifaceted entity, comprising an underlying identity associated
to a more or less wide spectrum of common realizations,
eventually including cryptic variants to which characters may roll
down given unexpected conditions. The fact that claims of origins
regarding each of these facets can be sustained independently of
the others is a strong piece of support to such ontological claims
and reinforces, in our opinion, the combinatorial approach
to homology advocated for by Minelli (Minelli, 1998, 2003;
Minelli and Fusco, 2005), of which Wagner’s approach may be
seen as a reformulation—albeit not unproblematically. Figure 2
summarizes Wagner’s model.
Let us turn now to the kinds of specific challenges that
the theory of homology/novelty thus far introduced should be
ready to answer. According to it, the traditional tenet that fish
fins and tetrapod limbs are true homologs, for example, should
be grounded on shared patterns of interactive activity between
genetic sequences and products. Actually, the prediction seems
to be borne out that a character identity network is conserved in
the development of shark and skate pectoral fins, teleost medial
and paired ray-fins, and tetrapod limbs, despite differences in the
respective skeletal elements. Crucial to the development of all
three structures is the early configuration of a structure known
as fin/limb bud, which derives from a self-sustaining loop of Fgf8
expression between the epidermis and the mesenchyme, induced
by other fibroblast growth factors (Fgfs)—mostly Fgfs10—and
Wnt molecules acting as signals. From that point on, a spatial
pattern of development is in place, controlled by signals that
determine the threemain axes of the fin/limb bud (proximodistal,
dorsal-ventral, and anterior-posterior) in a rather integrative
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FIGURE 2 | Constitutive dimensions of characters (“identity” vs. “states/modalities”) and underlying generative mechanisms (“ChINs” vs. “realizers”).
Within pentagons, novelty types associated to the corresponding loci (“Type I” vs. “Type II”).
manner. For example, the proximal-distal axis depends on signals
from the apical epidermal ridge (AER) of the bud, while the
anterior-posterior crucially depends on Sonic hedgehog (Shh)
molecules present in a zone of polarizing activity (ZPA) located
on the posterior ridge of the bud. Besides, Shh expression in the
ZPA is maintained by Fgf signaling from the AER, which in turn
is dependent on Shh to maintain Fgf4 activity in AER. As for
the third axis, two differentiated compartments of activity are
observed: The dorsal one, where Wnt7a expression signals the
underlying mesenchyme by activating the Limx1 transcription
factor, and the ventral one, where the transcription factor En1
prevents Wnt7a expression, thus creating the corresponding
axis asymmetry (Figure 3). These are, in a nutshell, the core
components of a conserved chain of genetic activity that
determines the underlying identity of fin/limbs across vertebrate
species—for more detailed accounts, see Wagner (2014, pp. 341–
347) and particularly Gilbert (2014, pp. 489–518). According to
the theory, the organ resulting from the evolutionary emergence
of this particular ChIN is a Type I novelty, irrespective of the
particular states that it originally displayed and the subsequent
specializations that it acquired in different classes and parts of
animals.
Is this fin/limb ChIN also associated to insect limbs?
Apparently not, which obviously runs against the idea of an
across-the-board (or deep) homologization of the corresponding
structures, along the lines of Shubin et al. (1997, 2009)—
or historically, of Étienne Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire. It is a
well-attested observation that common genetic sequences and
patterning mechanisms express in all these cases—for example,
distal activity of Fgf signaling or posterior expression of
Shh. Nevertheless, it is important to take into consideration
that the recruitment and reuse of the same or similar
developmental resources is more the norm than the exception
in very different organisms and structures, implying that said
resources are essentially unspecific regarding the constructive
roles that they ultimately acquire in different organic contexts.
Müller and Newman’s (2005) “initiating conditions” may be
FIGURE 3 | A schematic (partial) representation of the fin/limb ChIN.
Data from Wagner (2014, 341ff).
helpful in this regard, for it purports that very unspecific
and general causal agents have as a norm to pave the way
to developmental innovations leading to bona fide novelties.
According to them, such “remote” or “ultimate” causes bring
into existence primordial units corresponding to what they
refer to as “origination” processes, however devoid of the
identity of characters proper—an example that comes to mind
of such “leading up” event is “protruding,” in the sense of
Shubin et al. (2009), for it is equally involved in the origins
of different kinds of appendages. But assuming this, and
contrarily to Shubin et al.’s preferred interpretation, the resulting
structures are not necessarily homologs, even if sharing a
deep background of developmental resources. In the case that
specifically concerns us here, what still seem to be lacking
are comparable patterns of interactive activity between the
component pieces of a whole array of such developmental
means, crossing the invertebrate/vertebrate divide. So if anything,
similarities between the specific participants in limb development
across the corresponding classes should more realistically be
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submitted to a different chapter of molecular convergence
(Minelli, 1998; Moczek, 2008, pp. 437–438).
The conclusion is thereby reached that all vertebrate
appendages (fins and limbs) are homologs—“serially,” in the
same organism, and “specially,” in different ones, and that they
individuate bymeans of regulatory genes specific to their position
in different organismal contexts (Wagner, 2014, p. 345), maybe
as to also cover the paramorphic status that Minelli (2000, 2003)
ascribes to appendages as putative axial homologs of the main
body axis. This claim entails that positional information provided
by different kinds of signals also seems to be crucial for an organ
to display a particular set of character states, and eventually
a deeply interconnected (or “variational”) set thereof: i.e., one
where the instantiation of a particular state strongly compromises
the fate of development in the direction of some other state
or some set of interconnected states—e.g., autopod formation,
which acts as a suppressor of distal branching, thus directing
development toward a digit-styled instead of a ray-styled pattern
of termination.
Thus, the individuality of a given organ, both in terms of
its identity and in terms of the states that it manifests across
different organisms or within the same one, is according to
the model deeply rooted in the genetic make up of its bearers,
parts of which differentially react to the signals of concern
leading the way to the corresponding cascades of developmental
events. Novelties are therefore to be explored and decided at the
corresponding levels of analysis, establishing how they ultimately
deserve to be ranked in terms of type (i.e., “I/II”) or complexity
(i.e., “individual states/variational modalities”). As for the case of
language, the application of themodel thus far presented depends
on the preliminary question of deciding whether an organic
individuality can be legitimately assigned to it, obviously enough
not a trivial matter. Granted that it can—as we conclude in the
next section, the door will be open to further evaluate whether it
is a novelty and if so, in which particular sense it is. As we show in
the following sections, the fact that verbal behavior is exclusively
attested in the human species may be deceiving regarding such
controversial issues.
One Character in Search of an Identity
The theoretical model of homology/novelty thus far presented
purports that circumscribing the identity of a particular character
entails reducing it, so to speak, to its bare essentials, which
ultimately means: (i) to connect it with a level of developmental
organization at which an organic core can be abstracted away
from a periphery of divergent properties; and (ii) to unveil the
genetic circuitry (ChIN) that correlates with the expression of
such an elementary structure. The identification of ChINs and
accordingly of homologs/novelties at the phenotypic level is
thus the target at which the operationalization of the theory is
obviously aimed. The model looks pretty straightforward in the
case of a priori undisputed characters—e.g., fins, limbs, and so on,
the proper location, limits, typical and deviant forms of which,
etc., are not subject to relevant contestation.
Unfortunately, this is not the case of language. To be sure, as
pointed out in Section The Problem of the Continuity Problem,
some important steps in the right direction have already been
taken, with the identification of the basic components of the
linguistic phenotype. Recall, however, that this characterization
implies just a break down of language into its elementary
functional components, while, crucially, it is as yet far from
being an accurate specification of the character in organic
terms. Accordingly, the granularity problem, as formulated by
Poeppel and Embick (2005) is still an issue of concern, in spite
of the fact that the gap between linguistics and neuroscience
has become much narrower. Besides, as also noted in Section
The Problem of the Continuity Problem, consensus as to what
the basic functional components of the linguistic phenotype
are has not come together with consensus with respect to
the evolutionary status of these components, although opinion
appears to have stabilized around the idea that most, if not
all, of these components are true novelties, with the possible
exception of the vocal-auditory externalization system, which
might contain both homologous and analogous elements with
that of birds (Bolhuis et al., 2010; Berwick et al., 2011, 2012).
In this section we would like, firstly, to examine the arguments
proposed so far for considering language (both as a whole or
only partially) a true evolutionary novelty in order to show that
they are largely unwarranted; secondly, we would like to offer
an alternative, more nuanced view, arguing that language is an
evolutionary novelty, but only of the Type II kind in Wagner’s
(2014) sense, and accordingly one for which an analysis in terms
of homology is entirely suitable and appropriate.
The Quest for “Humaniqueness”
The uniqueness of language is generally presented as an a
priori assumption, which is nonetheless typically complemented
by a number of a posteriori arguments. These arguments are
concocted by incorporating different types of evidence coming
from such disparate areas of research as paleontology and
archeology, molecular biology, neuroscience, and comparative
behavioral science, but these pieces of evidence are generally
put forward to buttress what may be considered the central
element of the argumentation and what we will call here the
“complexity argument.” The argument is based on a fairly
transparent inference:
(i) The formal analysis of natural language expressions reveals
that they present a high degree of structural complexity
only computable by a device with the appropriate level of
computational power;
(ii) No animal behavior, especially of the communicative kind,
seems to possess a structural complexity comparable to that
of natural language expressions;
(iii) Therefore, the computational system subserving the
acquisition and use of language is a unique character with
no homologs in the natural world.
In other words, the rationale underlying this position is that
expressions constructed by means of this computational engine
(CS of Figure 1) conform to patterns of internal organization
that attain a level of formal complexity beyond anything
known in other sequentially organized non-human observable
behaviors, thus favoring the thesis of “human uniqueness” or
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“humaniqueness” (Hauser, 2009). In this respect, the most
commonly used tool to assess structural complexity is formal
language theory (FLT), through which specific patterns may be
identified and classified according to the Chomsky Hierarchy of
languages. In the technical sense of the term reserved to FLT, a
“language” is just a set of strings of symbols arranged following
a pattern describable by a collection of rules (a “grammar”)
obeying a characteristic number of constraints that determine the
types of structural patterns that may be present in the language.
Complementary to the notion of “grammar,” the notion of
“automaton” refers to an abstract computational device capable
of generating a language by recursive application of the rules
making up the grammar for that language. Since grammars and
automata are equivalent devices, we have a more or less direct
translation of the constraints imposed over the grammar rules to
thememory resources an automaton needs to compute a string in
a given language. Informally, the Chomsky Hierarchy may then
be seen as containing the three following linguistically relevant
levels of complexity:
(a) Regular Systems: Only linear inter-symbol dependencies are
allowed in strings. No external memory is required to
compute a string.
(b) Context-Free Systems: Long-distance inter-symbol
dependences are also allowed, so a further level of complexity
is added relatively to (a). An external memory stack is
required to compute a string.
(c) Mildly Context-Sensitive Systems: Dependences crossing
discontinuous substrings are additionally allowed, increasing
the complexity of strings relatively to (b). An external
complex system of structuredmemory is required to perform
the computation.
Languages may be further sub-classified within each type
attending to their relative complexity (Rogers and Pullum,
2011), but the resulting (quantitative) sub-hierarchies are not
particularly relevant to our concerns here. Note, however, that we
use the term “Mildly context-sensitive system” already to indicate
that no natural language pattern appears to require the full power
of context-sensitive systems.
Patterns of the first type are typically observed in the
phonology of natural languages, as in the arrangement of
consonants and vowels in syllables or of syllables (and
morphemes) within a word, which always obey strictly
linear constraints. Before we move to the next levels of
complexity, it is relevant to point out that not only are
regular patterns typical of phonology, but they also seem to
be exclusive of this level (Heinz and Idsardi, 2011, 2013),
while higher levels of complexity are only observed in syntax.
This observation will be of some importance later in this
section.
The accessibility of language to context-free complexity is
illustrated by syntactic embedding—as in (1); its accessibility
to context-sensitivity is illustrated by such common syntactic
phenomena as agreement or co-reference, for example—as in (2):
(1) [Mary said that [John will never change] very acidly]
(2) [Maryi said that [heri father will never change] very acidly]
Note that in (1) a dependency exists between the verb said and the
adverb very acidly that is interrupted by the dependency existing
between the verb and the intervening clause in square brackets,
giving rise to the nested pattern typical of context-free systems. In
(2), however, in addition to the verb-adverb dependency we have
another one between the proper nounMary and the pronoun her,
yielding a crossed pattern, since the verb-adverb dependency is
only resolved after the antecedent-pronoun dependency.
Now, these observations conform to a robust enough
collection of facts about the structural complexity of human
languages that define a frame of reference against which the
complexity of other cognitive abilities, human and non-human,
may be assessed (Fitch and Friederici, 2012; see however Boeckx,
2013a; Benítez-Burraco and Boeckx, 2014, for some skeptical
remarks). To be sure, it is from comparative evidence of this
kind that most uniqueness claims come, inasmuch as when FLT
is applied to assess, for example, the communicative behavior
of birds or monkeys, nothing beyond linear regular patterns
is actually observed (Berwick et al., 2011, 2012; Filippi, 2014;
Hauser et al., 2014). Thus, on the one hand, when we look
at birdsong we see that songs are complex arrangements of
motifs or tunes combined following some easily deducible rules,
which nonetheless never transcend the structural complexity
of a regular system; moreover, nothing in the songs of birds
suggests that motifs are conveyors of semantic content or, to put
it differently, that they behave as human words, with the ability,
for example, of combining and forming hierarchical syntactic
patters. On the other hand, a quick look at the vocalizations
of monkeys and apes indicates that, while there may be some
hints of semantics in them, this does not come together with the
ability to combine them into complex vocalizations to produce
new expressions. This evidence is customarily interpreted in
the sense that what both birds and primates are lacking is a
CS implementing a basic combinatory computational operation
(typically referred to asmerge) that is supposed to account for the
full power of human language syntax and that makes it a unique
character in the natural world (Berwick et al., 2012, 2013; Bolhuis
et al., 2014; Watumull et al., 2014).
In our opinion, this interpretation is premature, for a number
of reasons. Take, first, the definition of merge, which is assumed
to be an operation with the power of building structure. For
example, in a recent paper by Noam Chomsky we find the
following definition (Chomsky, 2013, p. 40):
Merge (X, Y)= {X, Y}, where X and Y are syntactic objects.
Now, as already pointed out by Boeckx (2013c), merge as
defined above cannot really be a structure building operation,
but just an operation putting two things together to form a
set. Accordingly, the product of merging two objects is a new
object where no ordering or prominence is assigned to any of
the objects.Merge combines objects, but it doesn’t build structure
around them. How exactly the latter is achieved is not something
that should concern us here; let us just point out that there are
two logical possibilities:
(i) Eithermerge is complemented with other operations; or
(ii) Structure building follows from some special property of the
objects to which the operation is applied.
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(i) Appears to be the option most favored by Chomsky (2013),
who appeals to an operation of labeling to account for the
inherent asymmetry of syntactic objects, i.e., the fact that the
object {blue, book} has nominal properties, not adjectival ones.
Option (ii) assumes that the asymmetry has something to do with
a property of words that is preserved and carried over in further
applications of merge (Boeckx, 2013c). In our opinion, at first
blush (ii) appears to be the most parsimonious option, insofar
as it favors a really minimal characterization of the CS (i.e., it
performs just one type of operation). Thus, and leaving aside the
question of what this specific property of words might be, we will
make the preliminary assumption that the CS just implements a
simple combinatory operation, which we will refer to as merge,
but only as a generic term ranging over whatever operation of
this kind may eventually be identified as the most appropriate to
capture the actual performance of the CS (Hagoort, 2005, 2013,
for some suggestions). Let us turn then to birdsong.
As noted above, birds’ songs show combinatorial properties,
although, as far as human observers can tell, their structure is
not asymmetric and, therefore, also not hierarchical. Crucially,
however, from this it does not follow that a bird’s song cannot
be the product of a simple combinatory operation like merge.
From the fact that birdsong’s structures just show linear, regular
patterns it would only follow that either bird-merge is operating
with a shortage of memory resources (unlike human-merge) or
that the objects that bird-merge combines are fundamentally
different from human words; or both. But even in this case, we
could not rule out the possibility that the structural simplicity
observed in birdsong is just an artifact of constraints imposed
by the mode of production/perception, i.e., of the vocal-auditory
channel. Recall that human phonetics/phonology is structurally
as simple as birdsong and that only through the application
of sophisticated tools of linguistic analysis it is possible to
unveil the complexity of human syntax. Note that we are not
claiming here that birds possess complex conceptual systems and
that their productions may turn out to be as rich as human
expressions; we are just claiming that by comparing the simplicity
of birdsong with the complexity of human syntax one cannot
infer the absence of a CS in birds comparable to that of humans,
because the simplicity of birdsong might be an artifact just as
the simplicity of human phonetics/phonology appears to be an
artifact of the externalization channel.
Thus, in our opinion, the widely shared idea within modern
generative linguistics that the border separating regular systems
from context-free systems behaves as a Rubicon of sorts and that
context-freeness acts as the evolutionary hallmark of language
and the ultimate basis of its organic uniqueness is unwarranted.
The point that we specifically want to raise here is that we are
convinced that by embracing such a stance it is dubious that
linguists will make much progress in clarifying the question
that seems to ultimately motivate their evolutionary musings:
Namely, has language really introduced a new “identity” into
the organic world? It is our contention that connecting language
with a particular degree of computational complexity is only
tangential to the issue. For if anything, a certain complexity level
is a possible character “state” among others of a putative organic
trait: Namely, a CS with one or another level of complexity. So it
is our conclusion that the question of how language connects—
or eventually not—with the composition of other non-human
organisms, a mandatory step in order to disentangle its evolution,
is not satisfactorily answered by just locating it in a particular
position within a scale of complexity, as exceptional as this
position may happen to be.
An alternative better-grounded program for evolutionarily
clarifying language should be built, according to our view, out of
the following questions: What character identity can be accorded
to language? Is it a new or a shared kind of identity? In other
words, is language a Type I or a Type II novelty—eventually, a
combination thereof?
Uniqueness Demoted
Let us reiterate again that once a minimalist reduction of
language has been made, we certainly are in the position
of starting to formulate serious hypotheses to answer such
questions. For example, one may entertain the idea, given the
obvious fact that sequentially organized forms of behavior apart
from language are ubiquitous, that an organic component of
brains exists—perhaps once a certain degree of organization
is attained (Balari and Lorenzo, 2013, Chap. 8)—subject to
interspecific variation along the following two main axes:
(i) A specific pattern of interface connections to other cognitive
modules; and
(ii) A specific degree of computational complexity.
From now on, we will refer to this component as CCC—
for Central Computational Complex, as in Balari and Lorenzo
(2013), taking into consideration that CS just happens to be its
core subcomponent, but not its only defining trait: Interfaces also
matter (Hauser, 2009). So let us explore in some detail the idea in
the remainder of this subsection, yet only to conclude that it is a
well-motivated one. Note that if the idea is on the right track, as
we believe, it is CCC—and not language—that should ultimately
be deemed as a Type I novelty—with language just being a Type II
elaboration, arguably a variational modality thereof. For the time
being, let us concentrate on arguing that the idea that an organ
of computation (CCC) exists is a well-supported one, using its
human instantiation as a model system.
In this respect, the perspective provided by FLT proves to be
crucial, for it establishes the bare requisites that an actual CS
should fulfill in order to deal with language-related tasks. Before
we go on, however, we would like to open a brief parenthesis
in order to clarify the role of FLT in the evolutionary study
of cognition, which is often controversial. Criticisms of the
applicability of FLT are usually articulated along two different
axes (Benítez-Burraco and Boeckx, 2014, for an overview):
(i) The relative failure of the Artificial Grammar Learning
(AGL) paradigm, in particular with non-human subjects;
and
(ii) The impossibility to characterize human language as
occupying some well-defined region of the Chomsky
Hierarchy.
As for AGL, it is an experimental paradigm aimed at assessing the
learning abilities typically of non-human subjects by presenting
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them stimuli in some formal language incorporating structural
patterns observed in natural languages, like, for example, nested
dependencies (Fitch et al., 2012, and the papers that make up
the special issue to which the cited article is an introduction).
The very idea of AGL is, therefore, that if a subject is able to
learn an artificial language presenting some specific structural
pattern, then its CS may be at least capable of computing stimuli
with that degree of complexity. The problem here lies in the
difficulty of determining what it means exactly for a subject to
have learned the grammar of the language, or, in other words,
what the subject has learned exactly; this problem is particularly
hard when non-human animal learners are involved (Rogers
and Hauser, 2010; Heinz, 2014). Note that there is a crucial
difference between the application of FLT in the AGL paradigm
and the use we are making of it here: while AGL focuses on
the possibility/impossibility of learning certain structural patters,
we focus on the complexity of patterns already observable in
a sequentially organized form of behavior. So, to the extent
that the patterns are observed in the behavior in question, it is
obvious that they had been learned (or developed) by the subject
previously. Accordingly, whatever criticisms that may be raised
against AGL are not applicable here, because learnability is not
an issue.
As for point (ii) above, the problem mostly regards the
fact that many logically possible patterns within the same
degree of complexity have never been observed in any human
language (Heinz and Idsardi, 2011, 2013); in other words,
structural variation appears to be finite and FLT is not a tool
precise enough to explain why certain possible patterns never
become actual. Note that this problem is in many ways not
too different from similar questions about variation faced by
evolutionary developmental biology such as whether there is
a pentadactyl ground plan among tetrapods (Wagner, 2014)
and, we submit, it is likely that both deserve similar kinds
of answers in terms of the canalization or fixation of certain
developmental pathways but not others. Clearly, FLT is of limited
use here, but this is not in our opinion a sufficient reason to
consider it unworthy of serious consideration. Moreover, in a
naturalistic interpretation of the Chomsky Hierarchy in terms of
a “morphospace” of possible computational phenotypes (Balari
and Lorenzo, 2008, 2013, Chap. 6), where real phenotypes tend
to occupy the theoretical space in a patchy way, the alleged
weakness rather seems to be a prediction, and one that happens
to be borne out. In any event, the main point is that we
think that FLT serves as a bridge toward explanations of the
evolution of language taken as a bona fide organic object to
the extent that FLT does provide the tools to establish the
basic specifications of the generic computational operations
that can plausibly be implemented in a neuronal circuit—a
desideratum on which many neuroscientists, especially Poeppel,
have recurrently insisted (Poeppel and Embick, 2005; Poeppel,
2011, 2012, 2014; Carandini, 2012; Embick and Poeppel, 2015).
We can, in a nutshell, establish the minimal specification
of the computational architecture of the CS as an organic
character.
To be precise, such a device should be organized attending
to a dual division of labor model, with a first component in
charge of sequencing proper—“sequencer,” and a second one in
charge of maintaining sequences in active memory for going-
over concerns—“working memory.” It is one of our main claims
that human brains contain one such articulated system. Well-
established anatomical data can be alleged in support of the idea:
(i) Basal ganglia have been previously described as a
“sequencing engine” (Lieberman, 2006, p. 169), with
parts showing language-related specializations—namely,
the dorsolateral prefrontal circuit (Cummings, 1993;
Lieberman, 2006; Bonelli and Cummings, 2007);
(iii) Cortical circuits serving as working memory loops are
also well-known (Aboitiz et al., 2006), with Broca’s region
playing a crucial role in their linguistic specializations
(Embick et al., 2000; Musso et al., 2003; Grodzinsky and
Amunts, 2006); and
(iii) Reentering tracts of prefrontal nervous fibers connecting
(i) and (ii) are also known (Lieberman, 2006, 163ff,
and references therein), adding credit to the idea that
they conjointly act as an integrated system in the sense
hypothesized above.
Moreover, information about the developmental basis of this
system has accumulated in the last years. A still tentative, but
very promising hypothesis is that these data support the idea
that a network of genetic activity exists underlying the system,
with the properties of a ChIN. What follows is a list of relevant
conclusions in this area of research that clearly point to that
position:
(i) From the early years of the twenty-first century, correlations
between forms of specific language impairment and
disruptions of FOXP2 have been solidly established (Lai
et al., 2001). This is an extremely suggestive finding for,
on the one hand, FOXP2 is a gene encoding a forkhead-
domain transcription factor that plays an important role
in the regulation of development of several organic
systems—guts, lungs, brains, etc.; and on the other hand,
because its regulatory role has been specifically attested
in the cortical plate and the basal ganglia, among other
brain structures, by means of in vitro transcription and
in situ hybridization techniques (Lai et al., 2003). This
result is moreover congenial with the study of brain
abnormalities using fMRI in individuals affected by the
relevant forms of the linguistic impairment, which mostly
locate in Broca’s region and in the putamen (Liégeois et al.,
2003). Concurrently, Reimers-Kipping et al. (2011) report
that by “humanizing” mice Foxp2—i.e., by inserting the
relevant substitutions at the precise loci—a new pattern of
expression obtains that characteristically targets the same
brain structures.
(ii) The discovery has been added more recently that FOXP2
promotes neuronal differentiation in these specific
subpopulations of neurons in the brain by interacting with
the retinoic acid signaling pathway (Devanna et al., 2014),
thus regulating neuronal migration, by reducing it, and
neurite outgrowth, by increasing it (Vernes et al., 2011),
two key processes for neural circuit formation.
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(iii) Finally, an important number of genes have been identified
as targets of FOXP2 in the development of the human
brain (Spiteri et al., 2007; Vernes et al., 2007; Konopka
et al., 2009). According to one estimate, FOXP2 targets
285 genes in fetal brain development (Spiteri et al., 2007).
Interestingly, the same source pinpoints 34 transcriptional
targets that show overlapping patterns of activity in the
basal ganglia and in the inferior frontal cortex. Many of
these genes remain inactive in the development of other
structures, like the lungs. While it is obviously premature
to establish whether each of these genes cooperates with
FOXP2 in fixing the essential character identity of a system
of computation as defined in this section, or it rather acts as
a realizer gene modeling specific states of its human variant,
the resulting picture invites thinking that such a task may
become a promising avenue of comparative research in the
near future.
Taking all these observations into consideration, we believe
that the idea that a ChIN exists, in exactly the terms set in
Wagner (2014), in relation to the bare computational essentials
of language seems to be well grounded. So the door is now
open to formulate the main questions that this paper is aimed
at clarifying:
(i) Is language—qua CCC instantiation, a radically new
character—i.e., a Type I novelty?; and if not
(ii) What are its homologs and how did it evolve its human-
specific states—i.e., its Type II associated novelties?
One Identity in Search of Homologs
The study of the brain of songbirds and other vocal-learning
avian species has proved thus far the most promising source
of information regarding the questions above. Partial as it
already is, results overwhelmingly point to the conclusion that
postulating the presence of CCC homologs within their brain
architectures seems to be on the right track, thus supporting
our prior conclusion that no in principle objection exists for
postulating the same kind of computational activity (e.g., merge)
as underlying birdsong composition. In this final section of our
paper we first try to ground as solidly as possible our homological
claim and then devote some comments to characterizing the
most relevant evolutionary and developmental parameters of the
human instantiation of CCC.
The CCC Identity Network
The most extensive study thus far regarding the bird/human
connection at brain level (Pfenning et al., 2014), offers wide
empirical plausibility to the following set of claims:
(i) A massively shared molecular background speaks of
the homologous character of certain structures of the
pallium/cortex and the striatum of song-learning birds
and humans—the striatum is the substructure of the basal
ganglia system comprising the caudate nucleus and the
putamen, among other components, that serves as the
primary intermediary channel between the pallium/cortex
and other deeper ganglial structures;
(ii) Within the striatal component, the best-aligned correlates
are the avian Area X and the human putamen;
(iii) Within the pallial/cortical component, a significant
correlation exists between birds’ RA and zones of the
human central sulcus—particularly around the laryngeal
motor cortex (LMC), next to Broca’s area in the inferior
motor cortex; and
(iv) Relevant molecular correlations decrease when out-groups
are considered, like vocal-non-learning avian species—e.g.,
doves or hummingbirds, and non-human primates.
From an anatomical point of view, these observations offer strong
support to the idea that a pallio-striato-pallial system exists in
the central nervous system with the properties of an organ,
the identity of which traverses species boundaries. Moreover,
the well-established fact that, in parallel to the linguistic
specializations of the basal ganglia and lower/pre-frontal cortical
areas in the case of humans, the corresponding avian areas are
crucial components of the song learning/production system of
birds (Doupe and Kuhl, 1999) gives in our opinion extra support
to our thesis that a bare computational functionality must be
attributed to this organ—see Figure 4.
In Pfenning’s et al. (2014) interpretation of the observed
correlations, these are repeatedly referred to as cases of
molecular convergence between analogous brain regions—as
the last common ancestor can only be traced back as far
as some 310 millions years and with obvious intermittencies,
which if anything speaks of a deeply shared supply of
developmental resources and a limited array of potential
evolutionary arrangements among them. However, it is also
plausible that an anatomical “language-like” system already
existed in the most recent common ancestor of birds and humans
as part of a larger neuroanatomical system, but which only
individuated from that larger system in later evolution. The
question cannot be decided with the evidence at hand, but we
need to keep that possibility in mind. For the time being, we will
adopt the more conservative position that an underlying ChIN
is not only accessible from this developmental background, but
actually attested in different specific contexts, creating bona fide
homologs despite evolutionary distance—a possibility actually
envisaged by Wagner (2014) in the following terms:
If the idea holds up that homology (i.e., continuity of character
identity) is tied to the continuity of ChINs, then the notion
of homology can be generalized to situations where historical
continuity of the phenotypic character does not apply. There can
be dormant ChINs and, thus, there can be continuity of potential
character identity despite discontinuity of characters’ expression.
(Wagner, 2014, p. 417).
What follows is an enumeration of relevant observations that
in our opinion gives strong support to this specific interpretation:
(i) The role of the FOXP2 transcription factor in learning and
producing birdsong motifs was firmly established right after
the announcement of its role in language (Haesler et al.,
2004; Teramitsu et al., 2004). Moreover, Area X was also
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FIGURE 4 | Main morphological alignments of brain components of the birdsong and language circuits. Based on an image from Reiner et al. (2004).
(Figure 1), reproduced with permission of John Wiley and Sons, Inc.
early pinpointed as critically targeted by the regulatory role
of the bird version of the gene—FoxP2 (Haesler et al., 2007).
(ii) The role of retinoic acid as a key inductive signal in the
development of different nuclei of the bird song system
was already known even earlier (Denisenko-Nehrbass et al.,
2000; Denisenko-Nehrbass and Mello, 2001). The original
papers in this field of research emphasized HVC—a further
pallial center within the song system—as an area where
the effect was clearly observed due to the expression of a
retinoic acid synthesis enzyme—RalDH. More recently,
the observation has also been extended to lMAN and RA
within the same pallial component of the system, and
particularly to the striatal Area X, where the profile of
retinoic receptor expression is markedly strong (Roeske
et al., 2014). HVC and lMAN are routinely described as the
bird correlates of Wernicke’s and Broca’s area—the classical
language areas, respectively. According to Roeske’s et al.
(2014) extensive investigation, the role of retinoic acid
signaling in neurogenesis control of the referred areas is a
well-established fact.
(iii) Pfenning et al. (2014) also offer quantitative data regarding
shared specialized expression of genes in the critical areas
thus far commented. According to their estimates, scores of
genes contribute to delineate songbird Area X and human
putamen (78 genes) and songbird RA and the surroundings
of the human central sulcus (40 genes). The study also
identifies tens of genes specifically contributing to the
anatomical specialization of RA and the laryngeal motor
cortex (LMC), but mostly non-overlapping (only three out
of 55 actually overlap). Special consideration in this paper
is given to the axon guidance ligand SLIT1, for it is a target
of the FOXP2 transcription factor previously identified in
Konopka et al. (2009). For concreteness, SLIT1 is a ligand of
ROBO1, which causes repulsion of axonal processes from
cell bodies. Down-regulation of SLIT1 via FOXP2—as well
as of other putative genes—in RA and LMC thus behaves
as a permissive mechanism leading to specialized patterns
of connectivity. Other findings reported in Pfenning et al.
(2014) also point to the shared expression of other genes,
but obeying to different patterns of down-regulation, as
in the case of NEUROD6, probably active in defining
boundaries within RA and the dorsal component of LMC.
Considering the whole picture, what we observe is a pattern
of partially shared and partially divergent mechanisms,
seemingly correlating both with how the basic identity of
the character obtains and with how shared and deviant
states also obtain from such a background.
Note that we have devoted this section to the specific case
of songbirds simply for the extensive and detailed literature
that it has generated in the last few years. In any event, other
organisms have also inspired research projects in the wake of
the putative FOXP2/computation connection—see Shu et al.
(2007) for ultrasonic vocalizations in mice, Li et al. (2007) for
echolocation in bats, Kiya et al. (2008) for waggle dance in bees,
and Lawton et al. (2014) for pulse-song in Drosophila. All these
studies offer obvious candidates for extending and validating our
proposal. But in our opinion, data reviewed in this section suffice
to give clear support to the idea that a supra-specific character
exists corresponding to what we denominate CCC, the identity
of which relies on a shared core of developmental resources
chained in a distinctively interactive pattern, which paves the way
to a minimal form/function unit however open to a wide range
of formal and functional diversification. The next subsection is
devoted to briefly reflect on the specifics of the human variant
of this character, once properly located within its homological
framework.
The Human CCC: States and Beyond
According to the perspective put forward in Section Uniqueness
Demoted, CCCs vary along the following two dimensions: (i)
their connective specificities in different cognitive contexts, and
(ii) the specific degree of computational complexity that they
attain in these contexts. Up to this point we have expounded
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the main reasons why we believe that this idea is on the right
track, so we think that the claim is well motivated that the
human instantiation of this cognitive organ differs from its
non-human homologs according to the following two Type II
novelties:
(i) The interface connecting CS with the systems in charge
of conceptual categorization, intention fixing, reasoning,
and so on, to which we will refer as the “syntax-semantics
interface”—i.e., the orange square in Figure 1; and
(ii) The mildly context-sensitive computational power of CS
itself, which allows nested patterns of representation of
indeterminate depth—e.g., phrases within phrases, and so
on, as well as intricate crossing relations among units located
at different nested levels—see (1) and (2) above.
Taken together, these two traits seem to suffice to set language
apart from other functional and formal variants of the same
organ in different animals, as the comparative perspective
supports the view that (ii) seems to be almost exceptional, save for
some intriguing cases of knot tying observed in the constructive
abilities of some avian species, where nevertheless (i) seems to be
lacking (Balari et al., 2012; Balari and Lorenzo, 2013). Let us use
CCCHuman as a fancy name apt to differentiate language-as-an-
organ both from its homologs and from its language particular
external correlates.
The main task of evolutionary linguistics may now be
redefined as the quest for origins of the Type II novelties that
define CCCHuman, obviously enough not an easy one, for it
involves a complex array of motives, ranging from fine-grained
molecular details to gross environmental considerations capable
of jointly explaining how the corresponding character states have
emerged and stabilized in the species. No such a task can be
seriously undertaken in the few closing pages of a single paper.
In any event, let us devote some space to sketch what we consider
to be a very promising line of research that could fit the bill. Our
main suggestion is that the character states (i) and (ii) above can
be explained as outcomes of a single evolutionary event, which
makes us think of them as inextricably linked in the way that
according to Wagner (2014) defines a “variational modality.”
For concreteness, our specific take on this matter boils down
to the idea that both states derive from a general increase of the
cortical matter traversing anterior and posterior brain areas—
habilitating more working memory resources as a consequence,
concurrently with a general reconfiguration process affecting the
cranial box—giving place to a characteristically convoluted array
of new inter-areas connections, including new ways of access
to the working memory facilities (Balari and Lorenzo, 2013).
A proposal along similar lines has been recently put forth by
Boeckx and Benítez-Burraco (2014a), who also try to make sense
of the two processes together under the tag of “globularity.”
Such a name is aimed at referring to the characteristic
shape of the brain of Anatomically Modern Humans relatively
to the elongated configuration of the Neandertal/Denisovan
counterpart. According to the authors, such an innovative brain
configuration has the structural and functional reflexes of a more
extensive and fluid fronto-pariental brain connectivity, as well
as an enhanced modulative regime governed from the thalamus
(Boeckx and Benítez-Burraco, 2014a, p. 7). Computationally
speaking, this neural architecture basically translates into an
“unrestricted combinatorial operator” (Boeckx and Benítez-
Burraco, 2014a, p. 5)—a.k.a. merge, which enables the brain to
connect distantly encoded percepts and concepts in a cross-
modular fashion. We find certain aspects of Boeckx and
Benítez-Burraco’s (henceforth, BBB) model attractive and worth
pursuing, but we also differ from their ideas on certain crucial
issues. Let us expound them as a way of clarifying our own thesis
based on the “variational modality” concept.
One of the strengths of BBB’s model is that they have been
able to reconstruct a network of genetic sequences and products
that they hypothetically relate to “globularity” as the site of
the “syntax-semantics interface”—namely, the RUNX2 network,
according to their terminology. In BBB’s interpretation, it is this
network—through its expression in the globular shape of the
brain—that ultimately endows humans with their “readiness” to
acquire and use external systems of grammatical conventions
(Boeckx and Benítez-Burraco, 2014a, p. 1). Note that the position
entails that no organ proper—say, a CCC—is required as an
intermediary devoted to the effect. It is not our opinion that
this Piagetian stance (Boeckx, 2014) is necessarily wrong. In
any event, we also think that the position is neither right away
supported by the authors’ genetic database, which still deserves a
closer scrutiny in order to decide whether the RUNX2 network
can be interpreted as a ChIN, or it rather is a relatively more
unstructured array of “realizing” machinery. What is clear is
that according to BBB’s preferred interpretation, “globularity” is
a shape-related “state” (Müller and Wagner, 1991) attributable
to no other character “identity” than the brain itself, thus
preventing the formulation of homological claims at other
putatively intermediate levels. Let us put this question aside for
a moment.
For the time being, let us focus on a spin-off of Boeckx
and Benítez-Burraco (2014a), where they comment on two
further language-related genetic networks—namely the FOXP2
and ROBO/SLIT networks, already referred to in this paper—and
how they relate to the RUNX2 network (Boeckx and Benítez-
Burraco, 2014b). Here we find another critical point of departure
from BBB’s model, for they contend that these networks are alien
to the computational procedure in charge of the construction
of linguistic expressions—merge—and embrace the idea instead
that they relate to the “externalization component” of language
(Boeckx and Benítez-Burraco, 2014a, p. 14), conforming with an
idea epitomized by the following quote by Berwick and Chomsky
(2011):
FOXP2 is more akin to the blue-print that aids in the
construction of a properly functioning input-output system
for a computer, like its printer, rather than the construction
of the computer’s central processor itself [. . . ] If so, then the
entire FOXP2 story, and motor externalization generally, is
even further removed from the picture of core syntax/semantics
evolution. The evidence comes from the finding that all mammals
tested (people, dogs, cats, seals, whales, baboons, tamarin
monkeys, mice) and unrelated vertebrates (crows, finches, frogs,
etc.,) possess what was formerly attributed just to the human
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externalization system: each of the vocal repertoires of these
various species is drawn from a finite set of distinctive phonemes
(or, more accurately, songmemes in the case of birds, barkemes in
the case of dogs, etc.,) (Berwick and Chomsky, 2011, pp. 23–24).
We believe that the conclusion of the first part of this quote
is not really sustained by the observations of the second part,
for as we argued in Section The Quest for “Humaniqueness,” the
latter are twofold deceiving: On the one hand, the fact that human
phonetics/phonology seems to fit in terms of simplicity the
suggested list most probably is an artifact of the externalization
channel; and on the other hand, simplicity does not preclude
the thesis of a computational processor, based on iterative
applications of merge, being at work in the referred abilities, for
as we observed in that subsection, merge actually is as simple an
operation as you can get.
So putting all the pieces together, we believe that the
picture based on the idea that FOXP2-ROBO/SLIT are crucially
implied in the ChIN that aids in the construction of the
“computer’s central processor itself,” along the lines suggested in
the previous subsection, is better grounded than BBB’s preferred
alternative.
Note also that emphasizing the RUNX2-FOXP2-ROBO/SLIT
connection is one of the main motivations of BBB’s project. But
they interpret it as the outcome of the evolutionary encounter of
an old “externalization component” (FOXP2-ROBO/SLIT) with
a brand new “conceptual-intentional component” (RUNX2) that
specifically contributed the merge operation. We believe that
this interpretation, while attractive, is not clearly sustained by
their battery of empirical evidence, which seems compatible with
many other scenarios. According to our view,merge, understood
as the basic operative principle of natural computational
activities, must be there from the very evolutionary origins of
CCC—which we relate with the ChIN putatively comprising
the FOXP2-ROBO/SLIT network(s), while its complexification
is an event specific to human evolution and plausibly
exclusive of the anatomically modern branch—which has
credibly to do with the recruitment of the modern RUNX2
net. This is, obviously enough, an idea in need of more
elaboration. But let us simply note here some relevant
developmental details that in our opinion give support to our
view:
(i) It has been replicated in several experimental settings
that pre-linguistic children manage to accomplish relatively
complex computational operations in language related-tasks
in which no semantic parameter seems to be at work—for
example, the identification of patterns of organization in
syllabic stimuli (Marcus et al., 1999; Gervain et al., 2012); and
(ii) It is also a well-attested fact that children start unraveling
the subtleties of the complex organization of linguistic
expressions aided by means mostly provided by the
“phonetics/phonology interface”—or “externalization
component;” the red square in Figure 1 (Kuhl et al., 2008).
So computational activity seems to be at work very early,
independent of semantic concerns and in close concert with
the phonetics/phonology interface. It is thus our conclusion
that the growth of CCChuman works differently and goes in a
direction opposite to the one privileged by BBB’s model, at least
developmentally and very plausibly, also evolutionarily.
To conclude, let us briefly go back to the issue we left pending
above: i.e., the best way of making sense of the evolutionary
expansion of CCC that, following BBB, we are putatively
associating to their RUNX2 network. Two alternative possibilities
seem equally compatible with the perspective put forward in this
paper:
(i) The RUNX2 network just comprises an interconnected array
of “realizer genes” evolutionarily recruited by the CCC’s
ChIN, so the resulting new pattern of neural connectivity
and degree of computational power are correspondingly just
the defining “states” of this new “variational modality” of the
organ; or
(ii) The RUNX2 network qualifies as a bona fide new ChIN,
for it conforms to the typical organizational pattern of
this biological entity as described by Wagner (2014), very
much like the ChIN that we postulate as associated to the
FOXP2-ROBO/SLIT net(s). Note that this is a possibility
actually contemplated in Wagner’s model: i.e., that the
“states” making up a particular “character” qualify in their
turn as characters (Wagner, 2014, p. 355), as for example the
autopod relatively to tetrapod limb. Were this interpretation
the correct one, the new pattern of neural connectivity
and degree of computational power would correspondingly
qualify as a brand new organ associated to CCChuman, itself
an embracing organ. Note that such a scenario opens an
extra dimension of the combinatorial approach to homology
that we are advocating for here, namely that the “states”
making up a particular “character” qualify in their turn
as characters (Wagner, 2014, p. 355), as for example the
autopod relatively to tetrapod limb.
We are not in the position of settling the question in one or
another direction, but the take-home message is that this—as
many others reviewed in this paper—is an empirical matter, and
probably one apt to be answered in the short run by a close
technical scrutiny of the inventory of gene products pinpointed
by BBB.
Conclusion
“Language” is a loaded term, with different meanings for different
people. In this paper we have strived to restrict its meaning to
refer to the set of brain areas and circuits that make it possible
that humans acquire and use at least one “language” like Italian,
Russian, or Nicaraguan Sign Language. Already this last sentence
shows the kinds of terminological and ontological difficulties
faced by any attempt to build solid and biologically grounded
linguistic and cognitive sciences. Our point of departure here
has been that, necessarily, “language,” as a technical term, has
an organic referent. Most of the paper is devoted to uncovering
what this organic referent is or might be. To this end, we
applied the strategy of asking to what extent language possesses
an identity as an organic character and in which sense it can
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be deemed an evolutionary novelty. The natural foundation on
which these questions should be framed was, in our opinion,
the long tradition in theoretical biology devoted to the study
of homologies and, in particular, Wagner’s seminal contribution
to the topic. In many ways, then, our project was not too
different from Richard Owen’s cogitations as to whether the
word “vomer” is an appropriate term to designate a bone found
in the skeletons of humans and whales, because it is the same
bone (Owen, 1848).
But our project was also different, because the debate on
the biology of language has been largely vitiated by too many
a priori functional considerations that, among other things,
already turned the homology question into a preposterous
one: There clearly is nothing like “language” in the organic
world. As we hope to have shown here, this statement is
only partially true. There certainly is nothing comparable to
“language” understood as the organic structure that facilitates the
acquisition and use of languages, and in this sense “language”
is a term only applicable to refer to this particular structure
in humans. Once we forgo such “what-is-it-for” considerations
and focus on the kinds of basic activities that characterize
“language,” what we see is a natural system of computation with
many possible homologs in the natural world. If we were to
establish a parallelism, our term “CCC” would be comparable
to the term “vertebrate limb,” while “language” would perhaps
be similar to the term “bird’s wing.” Terminological questions
aside, we believe that this proposal has the virtue of overcoming
a number of conceptual and theoretical hurdles that placed
evolutionary cognition on the verge of absolute stagnation.
For example, a paradigmatic side-effect of the uniqueness
claims has been the excessive attention paid by neurolinguistic
studies on cortical areas of the human brain under (the often
hidden) assumption that since language is unique it must
have something to do with the also unique development of
the human cortex. As expounded in Section One Identity in
Search of Homologs, more attention should be paid to the
role of other, very ancient, brain structures, like the basal
ganglia or the thalamus, with clear homologs in the brains of
other organisms at the anatomical and, quite plausibly, also the
activity level (Fedorenko and Thompson-Schill, 2014; Hagoort,
2014).
We wouldn’t like to close these concluding remarks without
identifying a number of open questions the field still needs to
face, in addition to those already made explicit in the preceding
sections.
(i) The problem of selection. Wagner (2014) contends that the
role of selection is negligible in Type I novelties but (with
varying degrees) inescapable in their diversification (Type
II novelties); we alternatively suspect that the distinguishing
character states of language as a particular instantiation
of CCC may also be relatively alien to a strictly selective
logic (Balari and Lorenzo, 2013). This particular point is
illustrative of the important role that language may play in
helping to fine tune a general theory of evo-devo.
(ii) The problem of ontology. The interpretation of “language”
we have been advocating for here appears to imply
a sharp dichotomy between a neurobiological entity,
on the one hand, and a cultural/social entity on the
other. To be sure, some authors seem to take this
dualism to heart (e.g., Christiansen and Chater, 2008;
Boeckx and Benítez-Burraco, 2014a, p. 1), as if, much
in the Piagetian/Vygotskian tradition, linguistic neural
structures were just the appropriate receptacle of the
linguistic knowledge to be developed during the process
of language acquisition (Bickerton, 2014, for criticisms of
this view). We ourselves have appealed to this dichotomy
for methodological reasons (Balari and Lorenzo, 2013,
Chap. 1), but we have also emphasized that such a
dualistic conception has no place in a truly evolutionary
developmental approach, for there is no real distinction
between the development of the brain and the acquisition
of language (Dove, 2012; Balari and Lorenzo, 2015,
for a congenial view). We are in fact convinced that
the ontological problem can be overridden by taking
seriously the agenda of developmental models of cultural
evolution like those proposed by Griesemer and Wimsatt,
incorporating such notions as “developmental hybrid”
(Wimsatt and Griesemer, 2007; Wimsatt, 2013; Griesemer,
2014a,b; Minelli, 2014), to give rise to a more integrative
interdisciplinary approach (Love and Lugar, 2013).
(iii) The problem of representation(s). The granularity problem
(Poeppel and Embick, 2005) can in fact be broken down
into two subproblems: (i) The problem of computational
primitives, and (ii) The problem of representations (Embick
and Poeppel, 2015). In this paper, we have mostly
concentrated on the first, while we almost totally neglected
the second, apart from a swift comment on the issue of
words in natural language. The case of words is just an
example of a much broader problem posing two hard
questions: (i) What are representations?, orWhat format do
they have?, and (ii) How do representations represent? This
is a very old puzzle, dating back at least to Aristotle, but
it is also a very hard one, for which an acceptable solution
in biological terms is still wanting—Cummins (1989), for a
good exposition of the several issues involved.
These issues have been present in one or another form for a long
time. We believe however that the conceptual tools provided by
evolutionary developmental biology may help us approach them
from a new angle, one capable of dispelling the new wave of
skepticism that is again haunting the field, as witnessed by the
publication of Hauser et al. (2014), a paper with some eminent
scholars among its authors, which contends that the question of
the origins of language remains as mysterious as ever.
Hopefully, we expect to have shown otherwise.
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